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Introduction 
 
Europe has proved to be the focus for research in what has come to be 
termed non-traditional – in some ways, non-American – security studies for 
over a quarter of a century. Of course, one can find non-traditional security 
produced around the world, indeed, in the United States as much as in 
Canada, Australia, India, and Singapore. Yet we would contend that the 
majority of such work originated, and is still formed, in Europe, and it is in 
Europe that the central schools of thought have been developed. Important 
contributions have been made by scholars self-consciously freed from the 
constraints of realist and rationalist thought, working away from that which 
often has been presented as an ‘American’ mainstream. Some of this work 
has been furthered by research grants from European funding agencies, and 
this has helped develop a continental wide spread of a language of non-
traditional security studies which, increasingly, has been dominated by three 
schools of thought. It is our contention in this paper that the next stage of 
the development of this European interest in non-traditional security theory 
is, logically, an attempt to understand more fully how to move from ‘theory’ 
to ‘practice’; how, in other words, theoretical constructions can be applied 
to empirical studies, and in so doing, to understand the challenges posed by 
theory to method. This article, thus, seeks to elucidate the nature of this 
security language theoretically, and provide both insight and questions for 
how researchers might take these theoretical frames into the field to 
understand everyday security practices. 
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In Europe the once fierce debate over ‘widening’ the study of security 
has been won by the ‘wideners’, and security studies now commonly 
comprises environmental, societal (identity), political and economic 
security issues alongside traditional concerns of military security. Many, 
though not all, of those in favour of ‘widening’, also believe in the 
‘deepening’ of security, whereby security studies is to account for other 
referent objects of security alongside the state, most notably individual 
persons. Thus the range of choice that the analyst has when beginning a 
study of security framed by non-traditional concerns not only comprises 
five different sectors of security, but also a vertical range including security 
at the individual, group, state, regional and global levels. In the European 
context, this direction is heuristically dated to Barry Buzan’s People, States 
and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (1983). 
Buzan’s work inspired many, and was complemented in the 1980s by other 
works seeking to reshape the agenda of security studies, such as Caroline 
Thomas’s In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations 
(1987).  
Scholarship in Europe from this time onwards has been a site for the 
development of ‘non-traditional’ security theory, and here the ‘tradition’ has 
been the forms of security studied that predominates in the United States, 
specifically forms of realism, neo-liberalism and, later, conventional 
constructivism.
2
 Among the most prolific of these are: securitisation theory 
associated with Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan; emancipation theory 
developed by Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones; and insecuritisation 
theory promoted by Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans. Of course, they are by 
no means the only approaches to understanding security developed and 
utilised by scholars in Europe. However, these bodies of theory have 
achieved significant prominence, as seen in their deployment in the way that 
the discipline is taught across the continent, and in their use as frameworks 
for analysis, both in many doctoral theses throughout Europe, in research 
grant applications, and at many conferences.
3
  Thus, in what follows, we do 
not suggest that these three theories are in some way more important than 
others; but rather that their prominence in discussions about security in 
Europe means that they merit a focus.  
Although in the relevant literature these three theories are frequently 
described as the ‘Copenhagen’, ‘Welsh’ (or ‘Aberystwyth’) and ‘Paris’ 
schools respectively, we consciously refrain from using these labels because 
the categorisation into schools (especially with the geographical prefix, as is 
the case here) is unnecessarily exclusive, suggesting not only that each 
would-be school is a closed group, but also potentially hampering dialogue 
between the various proponents.
4
 There is an intellectual logic leading to 
dialogue between the so-called schools because proponents of each theory 
are concerned with the meaning of security itself, with the practice of 
 11 
security, and also with the role of the analyst vis-à-vis security policies.
5
  
Yet in this article we are not concerned with making an argument for 
common ground between two or more of these security theories; instead our 
aim is to look at how an analyst can engage in applied research in any of the 
given theories. The concern is to understand the questions that an analyst 
must face and decide upon when she embarks upon a piece of empirical 
research framed by one or other of these theories. To this end we are 
concerned with the focus of the respective theory, what theoretical 
dilemmas this entails, and therefore which methodological issues prove 
challenging to empirical research. How, in short, do we achieve a 
securitisation, emancipation, or insecuritisation security study? 
The article is divided into three parts. Part one provides an overview of 
the three security theories according to their originators. Based on this 
overview part two assesses the theoretical coherence of each theory. Part 
three looks at the operationalisation of each theory in practice. In other 
words, it is concerned with the question: how to deploy one of these three 
forms of non-traditional security studies to a specific security problematic. 
 
1. Contemporary European Security Studies  
 
This first part of the article examines the theoretical structures of the three 
predominant European approaches to security within their own terms, to 
understand the nature of the theoretical concerns manifested by each set of 
authors within each set of theories. 
 
Securitisation Theory 
 
Securitisation theory dates back to the late 1980s, when it was initiated by 
Ole Wæver, then a researcher at the former Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute. It was developed with the stated purpose of moving security 
studies beyond Waltzian neorealism, and beyond the critique offered by 
poststructuralist critics (above all Richard Ashley). The essence of 
securitisation theory is the idea that in international relations something 
becomes a matter of emergency politics / a security issue not because 
something constitutes an objective threat to the state as, for example, 
neorealism would have it, but rather something becomes a security issue 
when a powerful securitising actor (often, but not necessarily, the state) 
argues that this something constitutes an existential threat to some object 
that needs to be dealt with immediately if the object is to survive.
6
 In the 
case of environmental security, such an argument might see a securitising 
actor declare that if we want to curb irreversible and life threatening climate 
change then we must take emergency measures immediately, before it is too 
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late for us to act in a meaningful way. The logic whereby something 
becomes a security issue because it is spoken of in the language of security 
is a ‘performative speech act.’7 By saying something, that thing is done, as 
by uttering the words ‘I do’ at a wedding, a marriage comes into existence. 
 Securitisation, however, does not simply come into being when one 
actor declares an existential threat; this is merely the securitising move. 
Instead, a securitisation exists only at the point when a designated audience 
accepts the speech act. Securitisation is thus both a performative speech act, 
whereby in speaking security it is done, as well as an intersubjective process 
between the securitising actor and an audience.
8
 Once an issue has been 
‘accepted’ by an audience, a securitising actor is in the position to evoke 
emergency measures and go beyond established rules in an effort to address 
the threat. ‘Securitisation is fulfilled […] by cases of existential threats that 
legitimise the breaking of rules.’9 Neither rule breaking nor emergency 
measures are necessary conditions for a securitisation; they are what define 
a securitisation’s success. In the words of Buzan et al, ‘[a] successful 
securitisation has three components (or steps): existential threats, 
emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of 
rules.’10    
 Securitisation theory has been developed as an analytical tool meant to 
help analysts establish who securitised, by what means and to what 
effects.
11
 It allows no conceptual room for what ought to be securitised. 
Notably, the securitising actor and the security analyst are two functionally 
distinct entities, with the analyst in no position to enter the security equation 
in order to make recommendations. In the words of Buzan et al.:  
 
The designation of what constitutes a security issue comes from 
political actors, not analysts, but analysts interpret political 
actors’ actions and sort out when these actions fulfil the security 
criteria. It is, further, the analyst who judges whether the actor is 
effective in mobilizing support around the security reference 
(i.e. the attempted securitizers are ‘judged’ first by other social 
actors and citizens, and the degree of their following is then 
interpreted and measured by us). Finally, to assess the 
significance of an instance of securitization, analysts study its 
effects on other units. The actor commands at only one very 
crucial step: the performance of a political act in a security 
mode.12  
 
Although securitisation theory is an analytic tool, Buzan et al have 
expressed a normative preference for desecuritisation over securitisation.
13
 
Desecuritisation is the process whereby issues that were formerly 
securitised are downgraded and moved back into the normal political realm, 
where they can be dealt with by the normal rules and regulations of 
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(democratic) politics. Achieving security therefore is not an end point; 
rather, the end point is to remove an issue from the security agenda 
altogether – a classic example being the relationship between France and 
Germany, no longer a security relationship, but part of normal political 
relations.  
 Although there is still much work to be done in developing 
securitisation theory – for example, in defining audience and its relationship 
with the securitising actor (see below) – the move into desecuritisation 
creates interesting opportunities.
14
 Desecuritisation connects clearly to 
peacemaking and to peace building agendas.
15
 Both seek (amongst other 
elements) to find ways to reduce tensions and fears of violence; both are 
seeking to restore or develop political processes that are regular and not 
subject to emergency measures. In short, both are committed to that which 
Waever describes as desecuritisation. 
 
Emancipatory Theory  
 
Whereas securitisation theory was developed from within international 
relations, emancipatory theory is in part deeply rooted in Critical theory, a 
body of literature united by the belief that theoretical enquiry is never free 
from perspective and intention. Critical theory is thus necessarily a 
normative exercise. Its proponents aim to liberate (or evoke self-liberation) 
from what they regard as the various false and often dangerous 
consciousnesses of our orthodox concepts and categories. The aim is to 
make people realise that they are not stuck with the world or some aspect of 
society as it is, but that there exist realisable alternative realities, which are 
better suited to people’s welfare, fulfilment and happiness. As Robert Cox 
most famously put it, ‘Theory is always for someone, and for some 
purpose.’16 This, the process by which Critical theorists aim to alter the 
world in accordance with a normative ideal, is emancipation. Unlike 
securitisation theory, therefore, emancipatory theory has not been especially 
developed for security studies. Instead it has been imported into the 
discipline through intellectual engagements with the ‘Frankfurt school’, a 
group of theorists working at the Frankfurt based ‘Institute for Social 
Research’, amongst the most influential members being Theodor Adorno, 
Max Horkheimer, and more recently, Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, 
via scholars in International Relations, and above all, Robert Cox. 
 This emancipatory security theory was first developed by Ken Booth in 
the early 1990s. Symbolising the ‘new’ European move towards non-
American theory, this constituted a complete turnaround in Booth’s 
theoretical orientation, as he had previously written as a realist.
17
 The ability 
to change oneself and others has become an integral part of emancipatory 
theory, and its heritage in Frankfurt school theory was later significantly 
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clarified in Richard Wyn Jones’ 1999 book Security, Strategy, and Critical 
Theory. Nonetheless, Booth remains the main advocate. In 2007 he 
published Theory of World Security, the definitive work on emancipatory 
theory. Given that this book unites all of Booth’s previous works without 
any fundamental changes to the argumentation, our brief analysis here 
draws primarily on this latest work.   
      Emancipatory theory proposes that people are wrong to think that 
anyone is truly secure as long as realist understandings of security as 
‘power’ and ‘order’ prevail. For them, the ineluctability of the realist 
security dilemma, whereby one actor’s security is another actor’s insecurity, 
epitomises all that is wrong with mainstream (largely American) security 
theory. Booth further argues that patriarchy is a key element of insecurity 
that is necessarily excluded by traditional security analyses, along with 
issues such as class and race, which have been at best marginalised in those 
traditional analyses. Instead, security analysts should be working towards 
world security, which Booth defines as: 
 
… the structures and processes within human society, locally 
and globally, that work towards the reduction of the threats and 
risks that determine individual and group lives. The greater the 
level of security enjoyed, the more individuals and groups 
(including human society as a whole) can have an existence 
beyond the instinctual animal struggle merely to survive. The 
idea of world security is synonymous with the freedom of 
individuals and groups compatible with reasonable freedom of 
others, and universal moral equality compatible with justifiable 
pragmatic inequalities.18  
 
Whereas securitisation theory is based on the contestedness of security by 
theorising its self-referential nature, emancipatory theory holds that security 
is an uncontested concept.
19
 The reason for this difference is that 
securitisation theorists are interested in the practice of security while 
emancipation theorists are, first and foremost, concerned with the condition 
of security. For them security is ‘an instrumental value in that it allows 
individuals and groups (to a relative degree) to establish the conditions of 
existence with some expectations of constructing human life beyond the 
merely animal. Survival is being alive; security is living.’20   
 Security, or being secure, enables people to live meaningful and fulfilled 
lives fit for human beings. Booth argues that security should be seen as a 
means and emancipation as an end.
21
 If successful, then people will realise 
that they are indeed operating with a false conceptualisation of security and 
will consequently embrace alternative conceptions. By such a strategy of 
‘liberation’, we collectively move towards world security. For Booth, ‘[T]he 
practice of security (freeing people from the life-determining conditions of 
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insecurity) seeks to promote emancipatory space (freedom from oppression, 
and so some opportunity to explore being human), while realising 
emancipation (becoming more fully human) is to practise security (not 
against other people but with them).’22  In Booth’s view, means and ends 
are neither separate nor discrete entities, but are mutually constitutive.
23
 
Booth evokes this language to stress that the way world security is to be 
brought into existence must be in line with the principles of world security, 
that ‘it should be true to the end being sought’.24 This means, for example, 
that what he describes as ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, which would be home 
to world security, can never be achieved by war and revolution, because in 
such a new world order such means are unthinkable. 
 It should be clear from all that has been said so far that the role of the 
security analyst in emancipatory theory is very different to that of the 
analyst in securitisation theory. Rather than maintaining a functional 
distinction between analyst and actor, those working with emancipatory 
theory are simultaneously analyst and actor. In their role as analyst they 
offer a critique of the status quo in accordance with the world security 
vision. As actors they make the case for the protection of a threatened 
entity, thus gradually working towards achieving world security.  
 
Insecuritisation Theory 
 
Insecuritisation theory has been inspired by the works of Michel Foucault 
and Pierre Bourdieu. The writings of the former have been instrumental to 
the rise of the fourth debate in International Relations theory, much of 
which took place in the sub-discipline of security studies.
25 Bourdieu’s 
prominence in IR theory is a more recent, yet equally telling, 
development.
26
  
 New theories in European security studies discussed so far have self-
consciously been developed in contradistinction to that which many in 
European security studies believe to be the American mainstream. This 
creates differences in how security is spoken about between different groups 
of scholars, notably, for example, at the International Studies Association 
Conference, and perhaps even more so at its International Security Studies 
Section Conference. This is not the case with insecuritisation theory which, 
instead, was developed in contradistinction to other European theories, and 
in particular securitisation theory. Whereas proponents of securitisation 
theory maintain that ‘security is what is done with it’ (a self-referential 
practice), proponents of insecuritisation theory argue that ‘what is done with 
it [how security is practiced] determines security’.27  
Insecuritisation theory proposes that those security practices deemed to 
be internal to the nation state (policing) and those external to it (military 
practices) have merged into one ‘field of security’. By ‘field’, 
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insecuritisation theory draws upon Bourdieu’s conception, in which agents 
can only be understood in relation to their social position, by the interplay 
of the habitus (patterns of thought, behaviour and taste) of the agents, 
agents’ capital (which can be social, economic and crucially, cultural), and 
social rules of the field. The conclusion is that this new field of security is 
one in which the traditional internal/external divide, upon which the sub-
discipline of International Relations was founded, no longer holds. 
According to Bigo, both the end of bipolarity and the rise of the European 
Union have contributed to the undoing of the internal and external, as the 
collapse of traditional threats has left both internal and external security 
agents searching for a raison d’être, and the development of the institutions 
and mechanisms of the EU (specifically the 1985 Schengen Agreement on 
free movement) have offered the political space in which internal and 
external security practitioners can interact.
28
 Importantly, the empirical site 
for such work is, overwhelmingly, that of the European Union. 
For insecuritisation theorists, these developments have allowed for the 
emergence of new forms of ‘governmentality’, the interface between 
‘sovereignty’, ‘discipline’ and ‘government’ as envisaged by Foucault in the 
late 1970s.
29
 Governmentality refers to the art of government, which 
according to Foucault, rests on two poles: ‘the disciplines of the self and the 
regulations of population’.30 Security therefore should neither be understood 
as ‘an anthropological need’ (as in emancipatory theory), nor as a ‘speech 
act’ (as in securitisation theory), but rather as a ‘process of securitisation / 
insecuritisation of the borders, of the identities and of the conception of 
orders’.31 Or more explicitly: ‘Security is in no sense a reflection of an 
increase of threats in the contemporary epoch – it is a lowering of the level 
of acceptability of the other; it is an attempt at insecuritisation of daily life 
by the security professionals and an increase in the strengths of police 
potential for action.’32 Thus, without ‘security’ (understood in this way) 
there would be no insecurity. Bigo cites the historian Paul Veyne as follows, 
‘[…] we are wrong to imagine that the doing, or practice, can be explained 
based on what is done, as on the contrary, what is done is explained by what 
the doing was at any point in history. Things, objects, are simply the 
correlate of practices.’33 But a reference to Foucault would perhaps be more 
fitting. After all, for Foucault madness is but a product of society, whilst 
delinquency is a product of the penal system.
34
 A treatment of security as a 
product of fear and insecurity is therefore Foucauldian par excellence. Thus, 
insecurity is a social product, and security practice a product of 
governmentality. 
 Also Foucauldian is the strong concern for those groups (‘the other’) 
that are marginalised by the practices of governmentality. As Bigo explains, 
‘sometimes security creates unwanted side effects towards other groups of 
people’.35 In the contemporary European Union, this ‘other group’ is the 
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figure of the migrant, because migrants are seen as endangering ‘the 
population dynamic of which they are part’.36 Insecuritisation theorists 
engage with the claim that migrants are a danger to society as a ‘truth’ 
creation on behalf of security practitioners, emerging as a result of the 
interplay of, on the one hand, ‘the fears of politicians about losing their 
symbolic control over boundary territories’ and, on the other, ‘the ‘unease’ 
that some citizens who feel discarded suffer because they cannot cope with 
the uncertainty of everyday life’.37  
 In a further allusion to Foucault, Bigo describes the securitisation/ 
insecuritisation of migration as a ‘ban-opticon’. In Discipline and Punish 
(1975) Foucault aimed to write a history of disciplines, and how discipline 
is and has been used to control populations, and especially society’s 
‘deviants’. He argued that, change to the penal system occurred at ‘the 
moment [when] it became understood that it was more efficient and 
profitable in terms of the economy of power to place people under 
surveillance than to subject them to some exemplary penalty.’38 As a result 
of this, society had become a disciplinary society informed by a garde á vue 
(omnipresent surveillance) resembling Bentham’s panopticon. 
‘Panopticism’ is enshrined by means of the connection between power and 
knowledge; Foucault’s idea that power and knowledge are mutually 
constitutive. Unlike the permanent and continuous surveillance of all 
offered by Foucault’s panopticism, however, the ‘ban-opticon’ offers select 
surveillance according to society’s needs. ‘The technologies of surveillance 
sort out who needs to be under surveillance and who is free of surveillance, 
[according to their] profile.’39  
 This very different understanding of security as insecuritisation has led 
to the suggestion of an altogether different research project in security 
studies, one that is informed by a set of research questions and aims that 
have formerly not been part of security analysis. No longer is it the aim to 
‘reflect on the right definition of security and the diverse forms that it takes 
according to the sectors’, nor to focus on an emancipatory ideal. Rather the 
aim is to focus on ‘the securitisation /insecuritisation practices that run 
across the internal sphere as much as the external sphere’.40   
Insecuritisation theorists are especially concerned with ‘the political’, by 
which they mean not the level of party politics and personalities, but the 
process through which social practices, meanings and notions become 
constructed as singular, neutral and objective.
41
 Security is seen as political 
in at least three ways. It ‘sustains security policies’; it is an instrument of 
competition between political opponents; and finally, security framing 
‘upholds particular concepts of the political, i.e. of what political 
community is about.’42 This linking of the political and security is in and of 
itself not a new thing. For securitisation theory, both securitisation and 
desecuritisation are by definition political processes, whilst, for example, 
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R.B.J Walker has previously emphasised the constitutive relationship 
between security and the political.
43
 That which is new and extremely 
important, however, is that insecuritisation theorists want to unravel the 
political logic behind security framing and security knowledge, in order to 
overcome what Huysmans has called the ‘normative dilemma of speaking 
and writing security’: the process whereby security analysts are said to co-
constitute social and political reality by virtue of their own text.
44 
 
2. Theoretical Coherence 
 
Assessing the theoretical coherence of each of these European security 
theories is only possible within the aim of each individual theory, as the aim 
harbours that which the security analyst is meant to achieve by deploying 
that theory. That is, we are not attempting to situate our analysis outside the 
particular theoretical framework under examination. Our task is to analyse 
how well the analyst can achieve the stated aim by using the theory in 
question, as a precursor for understanding how the analyst might then use 
this theoretical frame in empirical analysis.  
 
Securitisation Theory 
 
The purpose of securitisation theory is to offer a tool for analysis with 
which the analyst can trace incidences of securitisation and desecuritisation. 
Of course, this is in the context of the analyst having a very specific 
understanding of security as, on the one hand, a social and an 
intersubjective construction, but with a fixed understanding of security as 
survival on the other. The analyst using securitisation theory must not focus 
on what security is, but only on what it does – because what is done in the 
name of security is tantamount to the meaning of security. Besides 
analysing incidences of securitisation and desecuritisation, securitisation 
theory is thus informed by a second aim, namely, to show that security 
operates in this way and no other. Indeed, the securitisation analyst aims to 
destabilise those approaches to security (traditional and non-traditional 
alike) that operate with objective understandings of security (as in 
emancipatory theory) by showing that security is a truly self-referential 
practice.  
 Though the two aims are clearly interrelated they generate two separate 
questions with regard to considerations of how securitisation theory might 
be operationalised: first, how useful is securitisation theory as a tool for 
analysis? And second, how convincing / useful is the claim that security 
operates like a self-referential practice?    
 19 
 Of the three European-originated theories of non-traditional security 
studies, it is securitisation theory that has generated the largest body of 
secondary literature. Many of the writings on securitisation theory have 
suggested substantial changes to the original framework of securitisation.
45
 
Whilst we will not look at any of these here, it should be noted that these 
amendments to the original framework are all necessitated by contradictions 
within the original formulation and by the relative lack of clarity of certain 
key concepts.  
      Without doubt the most important contradiction in the original 
securitisation theory is that securitisation is at the same time a performative 
speech act (whereby by simply speaking security, security is being done) as 
well as an intersubjective process decided between securitising actor and an 
audience.
46
 A related contradiction concerns the separation between a 
securitising move and a securitisation proper, a distinction that can simply 
not be upheld if a securitisation operates like a performative speech act, as 
then the saying itself (the securitising move) would be the complete 
securitisation.
47
 In relation to the ill-definition of key concepts, it is not 
clear who or what the audience is supposed to be
48
 and how to detect the 
securitiser. Taken together, these problems constitute considerable obstacles 
to the theoretical coherence of securitisation theory. Indeed the problem is 
such that analysts new to the subject cannot simply use and apply 
securitisation theory to any given empirical case study.
49
 Instead they need 
to begin by clarifying their own position on all of these contested points and 
also define what they mean by the various ill-defined concepts. As Wæver 
puts it, empirical studies that have used securitisation theory ‘do not follow 
a standardised format’:  
 
Optimistically, the diversity is a sign that the theory has a 
relatively clear core idea and sufficiently explicit 
conceptualisation, that it can generate/structure different kinds 
of usage and even produce anomalies for itself in interesting 
ways. The many critiques of the theory are in my view (mainly!) 
a sign of strength. You don’t criticise a theory that is so vague 
that it does not do much. If the theory is distinct enough, you 
can produce precise problems and these are then interesting too 
– and only possible to get to by starting from this theory.50  
 
So how clear is this ‘core idea’; that security operates like a self-referential 
practice? Quite unlike any other concept in security studies, securitisation 
theory captures the idea that security is an essentially contested concept. It 
allows the analyst to show that securitisers can use one and the same label 
to refer to entirely different ideas. Thierry Balzacq has argued, however, 
that a preoccupation with security as a self-referential practice has rendered 
securitisation analysts blind to the existence of ‘brute threats’, threats that 
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are not affected by the way we talk about them.
51
 For example, climate 
modelling suggests that climate change brings with it a number of brute 
threats. Regardless of how the governments of Tuvalu and those of the 
Kiribati Atoll frame global sea levels rising, these islands will simply 
disappear should the seas rise to a certain point. In line with this, Rita Floyd 
has argued that securitisations of objective existential threats are 
qualitatively different from securitisations that refer to perceived threats 
only and that in such cases securitisation might be the right thing to do. 
Indeed for her the existence of objective existential threat is one of three 
criteria that render a securitisation just/morally right.
52 
 
Emancipatory Theory 
 
Emancipatory theory seeks to free people from their false conceptualisation 
of security as national and military security, to bring about a better world 
order. Contrary to first impressions, proponents operate under no illusions 
as to the immediacy of the impact that an individual analyst might have. 
They realise, for example, that academics are rarely heard by those in 
power, and that one analyst cannot possibly cover all fields of expertise 
satisfactorily.
53
 As such, what is asked of the individual is rather modest, 
yet there is an element of moral duty to it. Thus theorists, in order to 
become critical individuals, must first of all change themselves. They must 
become virtuous individuals and do things a good person would do. That is, 
their intellectual commitment must translate into personal practice in their 
relations with other humans, seeking practical, immediate and everyday 
emancipatory actions. Above all, they must have the commitment to an 
alternative world order as possible. Indeed imagining such an order 
becomes their guiding principle.
54
 Finally, they need to reach out to those 
around them (students, civil society groups, etc) and spread the critical 
message. Emancipation is thus not one big bang moment instigated by one 
person or even a handful of people. It is instead a gradual process.  
 As a first concrete step towards a better world order, many emancipatory 
analysts seek to free ‘mainstream’ colleagues from their false consciousness 
of seeing security as belonging to the state and the military. In order to 
achieve this, critically minded intellectuals wage a Gramscian ‘war of 
position’ against their mainstream counterparts, always relying on the 
promise that their (emancipatory) argument will prevail.
55
 Notably, the 
‘mainstream’ that is critiqued is now more broadly based than simply 
‘American’ Realism/ Neo-Liberalism, with even that which was originally 
positioned within non-traditional security studies – securitisation theory – 
situated now within this ‘mainstream’ category, and therefore attacked for 
its ostensible state centrism (see below). 
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Beyond embracing the critical commitment, imagining world security, 
and campaigning for it, the other key element of the theory is its 
commitment to immanent critique. Here, the emancipatory analyst examines 
the principles behind existing policy and compares them to practice. Thus 
military operations in Iraq might have been about building peace and 
democracy, but this would have been contrasted with the practice in which 
thousands of non-combatants died. Through immanent critique, existing 
statist practice is undermined, and imagined futures are illustrated. Thus, he 
has to understand, engage with, and critique that which is done in the 
security world, undermine those approaches from within their own terms, 
show where the power structures lie, and from that basis, postulate a world 
security based alternative. As such, it has much in common with the 
intellectual strategies adopted by the European peace movements 
throughout the 1970s. 
It is possible to identify eight interrelated elements that comprise the 
epistemological position of emancipatory theory. First, that truth is 
indispensable yet inaccessible. Second, that therefore a philosophical 
anchorage is the most secure basis for knowledge. Third, a critical distance 
is truer than any general pretence to objectivity because, fourth, knowledge 
has interests. Fifth, power and knowledge are therefore interrelated, 
although in complex ways, and therefore, sixth, mainstream theory 
(popularised by Cox as problem solving theory) merely replicates existing 
power structures. Only Critical theory can emancipate, and there is therefore 
as big a difference between emancipatory theory on the one hand and both 
securitisation theory and insecuritisation theory, as there is between 
emancipatory theory and the ‘American mainstream’. Yet empirical enquiry 
is crucial, seventh, to the work of the emancipatory analyst, as the basis for 
immanent critique. Finally, all theory is constitutive, and therefore our 
choices about theory have a real impact in the world beyond the academic 
literature.
56
  
Perhaps the crucial step is at point three, the achievement of a ‘critical 
distance’ whereby the analyst is asked to step back from his own context 
and aim for a position that shares ‘the aims of objectivity’ (trying to free 
oneself from biases and so on).’57 Considering the other seven points that 
make up the emancipation analysts’ epistemological framework, it is not 
clear how an analyst informed by this theory can successfully be free and 
achieve critical distance. If the security analyst is at the same time always 
also a securitising actor and, if as under (4), ‘knowledge has interests’, then 
it is simply not clear on what grounds value judgements can be made. The 
problem for emancipatory theory is, as Robert Jackson has pointed out, that 
value judgements do not result from lengthy inquiry, but rather analysis 
starts with the promotion of certain values. ‘If political scientists adopt such 
an orientation to their inquiries from the beginning, they have, in effect 
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given up on academic study as a disinterested and detached study.’58 In 
addition, it is not clear how (1) ‘truth is indispensible yet inaccessible’ can 
be squared with the promotion of value judgements that are themselves 
truth claims. 
 Considering all of this, surely genuine critical distance can only be 
achieved if when analysing security policies the security analyst is 
functionally distinct from the securitising actor? Proponents of the 
emancipatory theory, however, deny the possibility of a functional 
distinction between actor and analyst. Booth finds confirmation of this in 
the existence of the so-called ‘normative dilemma of speaking and writing 
security’ captured in point eight of this epistemological vision - all theory is 
constitutive. Whilst it is true that all theory that believes in the performative 
force of language is subject to the normative dilemma of speaking and 
writing security, it is also true that this has been described as a dilemma 
precisely because it is an involuntary co-constitution of social and political 
reality on the part of the security analyst, not a deliberate one. Thus, Booth 
suggests that the choice of the referent object studied equates to the 
analyst’s normative position, and criticises proponents of securitisation 
theory - who more often than not study national security - as elitist for doing 
so.
59
 Instead of focusing on the state, Booth suggests that security analysts 
must exercise ‘ontological imagination’ and conceive of other referent 
objects of security altogether. He argues:    
 
Ontology […] is not a matter of abstract philosophy; it is what 
we take to be real, and so in security policy it is the basis of 
what we believe needs to be protected. This in turn impacts 
directly on such important issues as what we consider to be 
relevant knowledge, what the chief struggles are deemed to be, 
and how we might act. This is why the debate over 
understandings of ‘security’ is so important and why ontology 
must be turned into one of the battlefields in the study of 
international relations.’60  
 
What Booth fails to see here, however, is that the ‘battlefield’ he sketches 
out is not primarily one of ontology; rather it is one of epistemology. Unlike 
proponents of emancipatory theory, the securitisation analyst is not 
interested in making normative prescriptions for what ought to be a security 
issue, but in what is securitised, in who securitises, by what means and to 
what effect. Informed by the functional distinction between the security 
analyst and the securitising actor they do not choose the referent object (or 
for that matter sectors) of security as a result of their normative preference. 
Instead it is a reflection of that which they identify as occurring in 
practice.
61 
In other words, if the state features heavily in their analysis it is 
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neither a sign of elitism, nor is it a personal preference on the part of the 
security analysts; rather it is a description of the way the world is.
62
  
    
Insecuritisation Theory 
 
Proponents of insecuritisation theory aim to unravel existing security / 
political dynamics responsible for the insecuritisation of the ‘other’. As 
shown above, their definition of security as insecuritisation is derived from 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality, while they aim to shed light on the 
insecuritisation process by employing a ‘Foucauldian lens’ of analysis. In 
other words, insecuritisation analysis is informed by a circular logic, one 
whereby the method allows for only one conclusion, which in turn confirms 
the method and so on. Indeed, Bigo considers his own work an ‘extension 
of Michel Foucault’s work’.63 This is crucial to an understanding of the 
philosophy of insecuritisation theory and, in this context, it is important to 
take a position on the debate over Foucault’s propensity to overstate the 
facts in order to create a desired impression.
64
  
 Foucault also espoused an ‘anti-disciplinarian’ commitment, and a ‘war 
with the established intellectual disciplines’.65 Accordingly, Foucault 
distanced himself from conventional political theory and its 
methodologies
66
 and rather than ‘merely’ offering a form of political theory, 
Foucault lived what he saw as being the appropriate role for the intellectual, 
whereby the intellectual no longer is the ‘bearer of universal moral, 
theoretical and political values’, but rather ‘speaks out against the 
intolerable on the basis of his sectoral knowledge’.67 Barry Smart summed 
this up as follows: 
 
[A]ccording to Foucault, [the role of the modern intellectual is] 
‘no longer to place himself ‘somewhat ahead and to the side’ in 
order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather it is to 
struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its 
object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge’, ‘truth’, 
‘consciousness’ and ‘discourse’. In this sense theory does not 
express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice.68  
 
In other words, for the ‘specific intellectual’ there was no longer any 
distinction between theory and practice – Foucault himself had become a 
practitioner.  
 All this has two direct and interrelated consequences for the theoretical 
coherence of insecuritisation theory. Firstly, insecuritisation analysts 
consider themselves politically motivated critics, who struggle against 
security framing understood as insecuritisation. Thus the problem is 
insecuritisation and its effects on certain sectors of society, and from there, 
the analyst works back to the problem of security.  This can be seen in 
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understanding the relationship between security, on the one hand, and 
migration and asylum in the EU on the other. For Huysmans:  
 
Although it was clear that security approaches increasingly 
impacted on migration and asylum policy in the 1980s and 
1990s, it was difficult to grasp this as a straightforward process 
of securitisation, as understood by Buzan and Wæver. Although 
security language was being used […] it was difficult to justify 
that migration and asylum were governed as central existential 
threats. Speech acts explicitly defining migration as a major 
security threat to the European Union did not play a central role 
in the securitization of the Internal Market.69   
 
Thus, ‘Securitisation is not a speech act but a multidimensional process with 
skills. Expert knowledge, institutional routines and discourses of danger 
modulate the relationship between security and freedom.’70   
 The second consequence for the practical deployment of insecuritisation 
theory is that proponents cannot possibly offer anything but a negative view 
of security policies. Their starting point is the negative effect of 
insecuritisation on sectors of society. Theories of security studies that do not 
recognise the logic of insecurity simply reproduce existing security 
knowledge, hence taking part in the production of insecurity, when the aim 
should be to deny security knowledge bringing about desecuritisation, 
which in turn consists in ‘de-legitimating the ethical, political and/or 
scientific validity of security knowledge for understanding migration and 
asylum.’71 While some would view this as an ethically desirable position, 
and one that tackles the normative dilemma of speaking and writing 
security, others would question the idea that the academic should assume 
the role of practitioner. 
  The final issue concerns where and in what forms insecuritisation 
theory applies. Is it examining one phenomenon only, that of the creation of 
insecurities based on identity politics where the inside/outside boundary has 
collapsed? How broad is that phenomenon across the range of issues that 
comprise security studies? And, given that the empirical work is for the 
most part based in and on the EU, is this a theoretical model that has 
validity outside European boundaries, and if so, are there any limits to those 
boundaries connected to political culture or regime type?   
 
3. Questions for Empirical Research 
 
Having outlined in this paper three of the main theories of non-traditional 
security studies operating in Europe in contemporary scholarship, and then 
having briefly outlined issues of internal coherence, in the final section of 
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we turn our attention to the ways in which these theories can shape 
empirical research.  
 
Securitisation Theory 
 
Since the securitisation analyst aims to uncover ‘specific rhetorical 
structures’ for the existential threat, her research method is necessarily 
discourse analysis. Securitisation analysis must be conducted on those texts 
that are prominent in the public domain because it is ‘against the nature’ of 
the existential threat argument ‘to be hidden’.72 The specific structure of the 
securitisation logic also limits what kind of texts the researcher must read 
(publicly available texts by those with agency to be making a securitising 
move) and those that can therefore be ignored (obscure texts, or statements 
not intended for public viewing). Which specific texts are relevant in any 
given case is of course an empirical question.
73
  
 As part of analysing the discursive construction of the existential threat 
the securitisation analyst must identify the securitising actor (who speaks 
security), the referent object of security (who or what is to be secured) and 
the audience (who or what is to accept the speech act, thereby legitimising 
the breaking of rules). For the most part, the securitising actor and the 
referent object of security are distinct entities with the securitising actor 
speaking security on behalf of a particular threatened entity, for instance the 
state on behalf of its citizens. Whilst Wæver has acknowledged this it is 
somewhat awkward to say, ‘the state’ acts, as the state itself is composed of 
institutions, individuals and so on, for the purpose of analytical 
simplification it is common practice to equate states with individual actor 
qualities.
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 The identification of securitising actors other than states is likely 
to be much more difficult. For one thing there are fewer case studies that the 
researcher can utilise for purposes of comparison. For another, unlike for 
national security, no standard textbooks exist that tell the analyst who (what 
actors, institutions and bureaucracies) are involved in the making of 
security, which documents matter (official speeches, national security and 
defence strategies), what hierarchy exists amongst different institutions 
(spheres of influence) and so on. Besides, should the securitising actor be 
other than the state, then the analyst has to make a case for the social and 
political power of that actor to shape agendas and to speak security. None of 
this is of course impossible. It is, rather, a far less well-trodden path. 
As a general principle, in order to identify the securitising actor, 
researchers ought to look for ‘what logic shapes the action’ and not - in the 
first instance - at ‘who performs the speech act’.75 The same could be said 
for the identification of the referent object of security (the ‘who’ or ‘what’ 
is believed to be threatened). Given that it is the securitising actor and not 
the securitisation analyst that chooses the referent object of security, no 
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normative beliefs of the researcher herself should infiltrate the analysis at 
this point. Instead the analyst studies the text in order to unravel the 
specifics of the discursive move, thus allowing the identification of who or 
what is being secured. 
 As part of this analysis, the analyst also locates the final component 
necessary for a successful securitisation – the audience – whose precise 
nature again depends on the case in point. This may be relatively 
straightforward. However, it is more problematic to be able to determine the 
location of the success of the securitising move, which rests upon the 
acceptance of the speech act by the audience. Yet at the same time ‘accept 
does not necessarily mean in civilised, dominance-free discussion; it only 
means that an order always rests on coercion as well as consent. Since 
securitisation can never be imposed, there is a need to argue one’s case.’76 
In other words, the securitising actor needs to argue the case for why an 
issue should be addressed in security mode, and researchers must uncover 
the nature of this argument in addition to the simple postulation of the 
existential threat by the securitiser. 
      The close connection between the audience and argument means that 
securitisation theory has been criticised for not being applicable outside of 
western liberal democracies, where the power of argument is an essential 
part of public life and political debate.
77
 Though securitisation theory was 
clearly developed in this context, Wæver is eager to stress that the audience 
is applicable in all political contexts, for even the most powerful leader 
could not achieve successful securitisation without anyone carrying out 
emergency measures. The audience thus may be different things in different 
political systems; conceptually, ‘audience’ is not coterminous with the 
citizenry or population of a democratic country.
78
 This shows that the 
definition of the audience is actually crucial. There are numerous 
securitising actors who stand up and make securitising moves with reference 
to some referent object, but a securitisation has only happened when the 
relevant audience accepts the security argument, to an extent where this 
could be used as a basis for using extraordinary means to fend off the 
alleged threat. 
 
Emancipatory Theory 
 
The core commitment of emancipatory theory is to identify means of 
removing the false consciousness that limits the lives of so many, to 
challenge oppressive structures, and to imagine the means by which world 
security can be brought about. Theoretically, this means a close engagement 
with the writings of the Frankfurt School, as set out above, either directly or 
through writers in International Relations, such as Cox, so that the 
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researcher might be comfortable with a definition of Critical theory that can 
underpin all that follows. 
 The starting point has to be the identification of structures that are 
oppressive, and which lead to the functioning of false consciousness, not 
just in terms of social class, but in gendered relations, with ethnic, tribal, 
and other structural factors all necessarily considered. Once these structures 
are identified, the emancipation analyst must then examine the principles of 
those structures, and reveal them as not delivering that which they promise, 
but instead, to reveal their oppressive nature, through the means of 
immanent critique.  
 The emancipatory security analyst is also an activist. It is important to 
engage in these intellectual tasks, but also to actively engage in knowledge 
transfer, to seek to find ways in which oppressive structures can be 
confronted, and their false promises revealed, thereby allowing those 
oppressed to address themselves what it means for them to be free, and 
thereby, secure. Central to this is a positive demand on the emancipation 
analyst to imagine alternatives, new world orders that would lead to world 
security in which emancipation is at the core of human society. And those 
ideas have to be achievable – the task is, as Booth put it in the title of an 
early piece in this field, ‘Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice.’79 
 One dilemma here is to understand the relationship between the 
imaginings of the emancipation analyst, and the understandings of those 
with false consciousness about their own emancipation. The voices of the 
oppressed must be heard; but how much weight should they have if it is the 
case that there are contradictions between their emancipatory demands and 
the imaginings of the elite emancipatory analyst? That is, the voice of the 
oppressed must be heard, and in many ways it might be facing some 
oppression; but if it is still bound up with gendered distinctions that are 
detrimental to many, it is not yet fully authentic. Of course, such dilemmas 
are common in working through the mass/ elite relationship in all post-
Marxist thought. 
 It would be unfair to leave the pragmatics of emancipatory theory at that 
point, however, as there is also the demand for the Gramscian ‘war of 
position’. That is, as an activist the emancipatory analyst also intervenes in 
public debate, and works, for example, with non-governmental agencies. It 
is critically important that the cause of emancipation be advanced across 
society, and so it is encumbent upon the emancipatory analyst to seek to 
advance thought and action in this area by engaging in ways of security 
positions of intellectual and academic influence in and beyond the particular 
field of research in which the analyst is operating. 
 The emancipation analyst’s work is not confined geographically or by 
sector. The focus on world security for all humanity is by definition all 
encompassing, thereby emancipation analysis can be in Europe and Africa, 
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in economic, political, environmental and military spheres, and can be at the 
level of the home, as well as that of the state or the globe. One exception, 
however, is at the level of identity security, that is to say, the universalist 
claims of emancipation theory are seen as contra the relativist claims of 
some of those who work in identity security issues. 
 
Insecuritisation Theory 
 
Given that Foucault is instrumental in so many ways, a sound knowledge of 
at the very least Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The birth of the Prison 
and Security, Territory and Population is essential reading for any 
researcher interested in this approach. For those seeking to apply 
insecuritisation theory, the initial starting point is to identify a particular 
group who are the victim of security practices that make them the subject of 
a state of insecuritisation. With securitisation conceived of not as a speech 
act but rather a ‘multidimensional process with skills; expert knowledge, 
institutional routines as well as discourses of danger’, the insecuritisation 
analyst does not rely on discourse analysis alone, but rather utilises a 
number of research methods, including interviews. As such they should be 
able to offer a more complete picture of any given securitisation than 
securitisation theorists, who have been criticised for focusing on too narrow 
an array of sources for pinpointing securitizing moves.
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 Alas, the impetus 
for how precisely these interviews are used is again taken from Foucault. 
Thus, like Foucault (with interviewing prisoners for Discipline and Punish) 
they refrain from directly quoting the interviews with security practitioners, 
as they want to give those who are subjected to insecuritisation a voice, and 
not speak for them.
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 In this, of course, lies a major contradiction with 
emancipation theorists, who wish to shape those voices towards defined, 
emancipatory ends in line with imaginings of world security. 
 The identification of the insecuritised, and the granting to them of a 
voice, is followed by an analysis of the nature of the particular security 
field. Here, it is important to identify the social rules that operate within the 
field, to acquire an understanding of the habitus of the agents, and also to be 
able to map the nature of the capital possessed by the agents (social, 
economic, and cultural). The purpose is to be able to identify the  
 
[T]ransversal field of processes of (in)securitisation whereby a 
certain number of professionals […] occupy the dominant 
positions. By maintaining these positions, they exclude 
alternative discourses. […] The field is thus established between 
these ‘professionals’ with specific ‘rules of the game’ and rules 
that presuppose a particular mode of socialization or habitus.82 
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Of course, inherent in insecuritisation theory is the importance of 
understanding that it is a political choice to frame issues in security mode; 
those politics need to be exposed and critiqued. In so doing, it is possible 
that the insecuritisation analyst might bring about a different framing, but 
there is no universalist frame against which this can be done. For example, 
Huysmans’ study of migration and asylum in the EU is informed by the 
following research questions: ‘What makes a restrictive migration policy a 
security policy rather than economic policy? What is specific about framing 
these policy issues in terms of security? How does it differ from human 
rights or aesthetic framings?’83  
Security/political relations are to be unravelled by applying a 
‘Foucauldian lens’, which ‘seeks to embed discourse in technologies of 
government that are practically realising […] security modalities of 
governing free movement.’84 Or in other words, security/political relations 
can best be unravelled by analysing (in the case of migration and the EU) 
European security knowledge productions along the lines suggested in 
Foucault’s studies of governmentality.85 The insecuritisation analyst thus 
functions as a politically motivated critic. She no longer focuses on either 
widened and/or deepened notions of security. Instead, the objective is to 
struggle against security framing in order to achieve a different kind of 
understanding/framing of ‘the political’. This is important, because  as 
Foucault put it, ‘if politicisation means falling back on ready-made choices 
and institutions, then the effort of analysis involved in uncovering relations 
of force and mechanisms of power is not worthwhile’.86 In short what we 
understand by ‘the political’ is what needs to change.  
Huysmans clearly has done the most work in this regard. He suggests 
that in order to relocate ‘the political’ away from the Schmittian friend-
enemy dichotomy, desecuritisation needs to be redefined as a critical 
strategy.
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 Then, there needs to be a re-politicisation of ‘the political’ 
elsewhere in a pluralist realm - that is, alongside other normal political 
issues. Hence, desecuritisation is the normative ideal for the insecuritisation 
analyst. 
Insecuritisation theory can be seen from the perspective of the range of 
approaches in non-traditional security as perhaps the narrowest approach, in 
that it deals essentially with the societal sector of security. And, of course, 
the empirical work taken place to date has been almost exclusively within 
the European Union. It is not at all clear as to the geographical range for 
empirical studies focusing on insecuritisation beyond Europe or perhaps 
more fully, beyond the ‘West.’ 
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Conclusion 
 
Although there have been, and will continue to be, important discussions 
about theoretical similarities and shared perspectives between the three 
theories under discussion here, they each lead in different directions with 
regard to the methodological choices that need to be made. This conclusion 
seeks to summarise the steps that the analyst must take, having selected a 
particular theoretical framework, in order to be able to carry out detailed 
empirical work. Of course, there will be differences here, not least because 
the theories seek to achieve different ends: securitisation theory seeks to 
understand processes of securitisation; emancipation theory aims to change 
the world; and insecuritisation theory to give a voice to the oppressed.  
 For securitisation theory, the key starting point is that the analyst is 
functionally distinct from the securitising actor, and that securitisation 
theory is a value neutral tool for analysis. From this position, the analyst 
seeks to understand the logic of debate enabling him to uncover who speaks 
security. Perhaps most often, the ‘who’ will be the most powerful 
representatives of government, but it does not have to be so, and analysts 
need to be able to justify the selection of agency, not just assume it. From 
there, a methodological choice needs to be made as to what counts as 
speaking: speeches, government documents, images, and indeed, silences. 
In what way is the securitising move made? Finally, the analyst must 
examine who the audience for the securitising move is, how they receive the 
securitising move, and how it can be ascertained whether they have 
accepted it or not. Provided that the securitisation is successful, the analyst 
can then identify the emergency measures that follow.   
 Such a description of the methodological steps to be undertaken by an 
analyst taking an empirical example and examining it using securitisation 
theory is straightforward; yet enacting it is rather more complex. As we 
have seen above, securitisation theory is rather under-specified on some 
points, and so rather than simply taking the above as a methodological cue 
for action, the analyst still has theoretical work to do before operationalising 
the method in a particular empirical case. For example, he will need to be 
able to say what counts as an audience, and will need to theorise the 
relationship between the securitising actor and the audience; there is no 
ready made and agreed theory in place to select ‘off the shelf.’ But perhaps 
this is healthy. Perhaps the best way to further develop securitisation theory 
is through operationalising it with empirical examples.  
 With regard to emancipatory theory, the analyst must first identify the 
mutual constitution of an oppressed community with the power structures 
that produce that oppression. In so doing, she will necessarily first expose 
the elements of false consciousness that prevents the oppressed from fully 
engaging in widespread political rebellion, and also, through immanent 
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critique, illustrate the falsity of the prevailing order, demonstrating how the 
logic of the language leads to contrary practices, to the detriment of the 
oppressed. These steps are less precise than those under the method of 
securitisation theory, and thereby lead to perhaps still wider theoretical 
questions to be examined. What scale should be applied to the selection of 
those oppressed? If the focus is patriarchy, then arguably the empirical 
analysis is global in dimension; how then are local structures of patriarchy 
to be understood, empirically, in relation to the global? This is also 
important to the next element of the emancipatory analyst’s method: she 
must imagine alternatives to current oppression that are achievable through 
political action. Moreover, of course, she must engage in the ‘war of 
position’ as an activist, in order to further that alternative imagining. It is 
perhaps this last point that is most unspecified methodologically: what must 
the analyst do, practically, to further that new imagining? 
 Insecuritisation theory seems to begin from a similar place, 
methodologically, to emancipatory theory. Analysts need to begin by 
identifying a group or community that is subject to insecurities. Again, 
rather like the emancipatory theorist, empirically it is important to grant a 
voice to the oppressed or rather, here, to the insecure. But here the nature of 
the voice – methodologically – is sought for different reasons and produces 
different empirical material. For the insecuritisation theorist, empirically the 
voice produces data illustrating the nature and scope of insecuritisation, 
both for that community, and also by those agencies of governmentality that 
bring it about. Emancipatory analysts are more interested in understanding 
the structures of false consciousness, and in engaging with representatives 
of that oppressed community in sharing the imaginings of an alternative 
future. Insecuritisation analysts also need to focus very fully on the 
insecuritisation agents. Methodologically, they need to be able to study the 
agents to gain insight into their habitus; they need to be able to give 
discursive evidence for their social, economic and cultural capital. They 
need to understand the nature and dynamics of the powerful and produce 
data to illustrate that, in ways dissimilar to the needs of the emancipatory 
analyst. 
 These three European approaches to non-traditional security studies are 
rooted in different epistemological commitments, take different views on 
ontology, and are thereby frequently seen in opposition to one another. In 
this piece, we have not sought to counter such perspectives; indeed, as we 
have argued, each has fundamentally different purposes and aims. However, 
that is not all that there is to be said, certainly not when it comes to the 
question of how scholars deploy these theories to actually understand 
specific global realities – how they are used in empirical analysis. Indeed, 
from this point of view, these European theories of security have elements 
in common: they are based on discursive power, they are interested in 
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change (from politicisation to securitisation and back; or in the status of the 
disempowered), and they are all (though in different ways) operating self-
consciously as something different from mainstream theories of security 
such as realism and neo-liberalism.  
Much of the focus in recent scholarship in non-traditional security 
studies has been on ways of clarifying theoretical claims within the three 
branches of study, and also to further understanding the theoretical linkages 
between them. This work has been easily as important as that of the original 
theorists. Our contention is, however, that at this point in time more 
attention should be given to how to actually use these theories in practical, 
empirical studies. We believe that doing this will provide further important 
theoretical insights as empirical application highlights theoretical 
limitations that are otherwise almost impossible to detect. Awareness of in 
this way uncovered theoretical limitations can in turn usefully feed back 
into the respective theory, enabling further theoretical advancement, and 
ultimately increasing practical utility.   
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